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En route from Birmingham to Syria in 2013, British-Jihadi neophytes aged 22, Yusuf 
Sarwar and Mohammed Ahmed purchased two books via Amazon to prepare for their 
mission in Syria after joining ISIS: The Koran for Dummies and Islam for Dummies. 
Journalists were swift to disparage their reading. The book’s author, Princeton 
University campus imam, Sohaib Nazeer Sultan remarked “Even though they may 
have ordered it, I don't think they read it.” In 1933, aged 27, Adolf Eichmann moved 
to Berlin to join the Sicherheitsdienst SD whereupon he read Immanuel Kant’s book 
the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (The Critique of Practical Reason) for the first 
time.1 After his trial in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt of course dismissed Eichmann’s 
reading of the German philosopher as thoroughly vacuous.2 Ever since, writers have 
sought to undermine the veracity of Eichmann’s account. The global Jihadis are 
illiterate, a journalist recently commented: they’re not well read in the Qur’an, and if 
they have read it, they have thoroughly misunderstood it.3 He cited as evidence Abdul 
Raqib Amin’s YouTube rhetorical: Forget everyone. Read the Koran, read the 
instruction of life. Find out what is jihad.4 Eichmann on the other hand was not 
illiterate in his youth. Before Berlin, he had already read Kant’s Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals5; he would also re-read the Critique of Practical Reason, and 
from his testimony and terminology we can infer he was familiar with Kantian 
concepts that extend beyond both books.67 Had you read Kant’s book previously? 
asked Judge Raveh in Session 105 of The District Court Sessions of the Adolf 
Eichmann Trial. Eichmann: Then was the first time.8 Nothing so immortal escaped 
Eichmann’s lips. This passage of court dialogue has been ritualised in continental 
philosophy over the last 50 years, and yet, the understanding of Eichmann’s Kant has 
never moved beyond the “categorical imperative,” which alone cannot elucidate the 
role of Kant’s book in formulating the problem of Auschwitz qua Eichmann. The 
transcripts from Eichmann in Jerusalem are permeated with unclarified Kantian 
terminology elided in the longer project surrounding Eichmann’s testimony. This 
Kantian terminology appears in the guise of quotidian words such as “understanding,” 
“knowing,” “duty,” “truth,” “freedom,” that as I will argue in Eichmann are intended 
in a pure and technical sense—lifted directly from Kant’s writings—and they arise in 
the context of logical arguments and forms that can only have issued from a serious 
reading of Kant. This essay will perform a reading of Eichmann’s Kant, in singularly 
Kantian terms, that for historical reasons unclear has not yet taken place. That method 
will also require a thoroughgoing interrogation of Kant. 
 
1961: Eichmann’s Trial  
 
Addressing the chief prosecutor Gideon Hausner, in the infamous section of the trial, 
Eichmann stated “all my life I have tried to live by Immanuel Kant’s categorical 
imperative.” Presiding Judge Yitzhak Raveh would ask Eichmann, “What did you 
mean by the Kantian imperative when you said that?”9 Eichmann: “I meant by this 
that the principle of my volition and the principle of my life must be such that it could 
at any time be raised to be the principle of general legislation.” By principle of 
volition Eichmann is referring to Kant’s concept of the “will,” meaning the decision 
to conform to the absolute principles of a “general” or “formal logic,” the “science of 
the necessary laws of thinking” abstracted from all objects of knowledge.  
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In the “Fundamental Law of the Pure Practical Reason,” Kant provides a formula for 
how to live by the categorical imperative: “Act only according to that maxim whereby 
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”10 The “practical 
rule” is “universal,” “unconditional,” and must be “conceived a priori” namely, 
“without borrowing anything from experience or from any external will” – “for pure 
practical reason is legislative.”11 In Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals Kant 
considers the case of a person who wants to borrow money and promises but never 
intends to pay it back. He asks us to imagine that if this was universalised, no one 
would lend money: “For supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he 
thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the 
purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as 
well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider that 
anything was promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain 
pretences.”12 The maxim self-destructs and is therefore not a categorical imperative.  
 
Arendt argued that in carrying out the extermination of the Jews Eichmann was fully 
aware that his undertaking failed Kant’s test for the categorical imperative because he 
would have known that genocide cannot be universalised.13 But Kant would not agree 
with the very question: was Eichmann following the categorical principle through his 
actions? It is only through the “inner principles” of Eichmann’s activity and testimony 
that the question can be constructed in properly Kantian terms. Since no person ever 
can be sure to conform to what is moral, human action is not the judge. Kant points 
out that our behaviour in the real world is frequently immoral, therefore the claim that 
my behaviour does or does not conform to Kant’s philosophy, is a “synthetic-a 
posteriori” not “a priori” claim, a distinction established in the first Critique.  
 
Nonetheless, in the examination of Eichmann’s reading of Kant that Arendt would 
find so egregious, Judge Raveh asked the accused: “do you mean to say by this that 
your activities in the course of deporting Jews corresponded to the Kantian 
categorical imperative?” Counter to his original claim, Eichmann responded: 
“certainly not, because these activities...at that time I had to live and act under 
compulsion, and the compulsion of a third person, during exceptional times. I meant 
by this...by this living according to the Kantian principle, to the extent that I am my 
own master and able to organize my life according to my volition and according to my 
wishes. This is also quite obvious, in fact it could not be meant any other way, 
because if I am subjected to a higher power and a higher force, then my free will as 
such is eliminated…” 
 
Eichmann is cycling through Kant’s theory about moral freedom that appears 
throughout Kant’s three Critiques. Yet in Kant, “freedom itself is the condition of the 
moral law which we know,” what Kant calls autonomy.14 Unlike the “heteronomous 
will” of “animals,” that are governed by an external force or authority, humans have 
an internal process of self-legislation (autonomy) that allows one to make free moral 
judgments. Eichmann is correct that he could not have been obeying the categorical 
imperative if as he argues he was acting under an external authority, the third person, 
not autonomous judgment.  
 
But this is not the end of the matter, for Eichmann concludes with a surprising 
argument that by ceding autonomy to his superior SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard 
Heydrich from whom he received instructions he was ipso facto conforming to the 
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categorical imperative: “…since I can no longer be master of my free will and 
volition, I cannot in fact adopt any principles whatsoever which I cannot influence, 
but, on the contrary, I must, and also may, build obedience to the authorities into this 
concept, and then the authorities bear the responsibility. In my judgment, that also 
belongs to it.” By “belonging to it,” Eichmann means his decision to transfer moral 
autonomy to the third person was something he freely chose, a paradoxical act of 
simultaneous autonomy and obedience toward the categorical imperative. Eichmann 
is also referring to the passage above in the Critique of Practical Reason where Kant 
says Freedom is a fact “belonging to it,” meaning, reason. Eichmann’s argument 
mirrors the long debated dialectic of moral freedom conceived by Kant. Kant 
conceives of reason as “a thoroughgoing lawlike network” (durchgaengig 
gesestzmaessiger Zusammenhang). It is “law-like” meaning determined, but freedom 
is hardwired into the logical network. In Eichmann’s elucidation of Kant: “I cannot 
adopt any principles that would eradicate freedom, even under the unbending law of 
moral reason, I still choose what to think, and what moral action to take.”  
 
Raveh: Do you mean to say by this that following the authorities’ orders blindly 
signifies realizing the Kantian categorical imperative? Eichmann’s reply collapses the 
actual law (the third Reich) with Kant’s law of the categorical imperative, just as it 
dissolves the commonplace notion of legal duty with Kant’s notion of will, and moral 
duty. Eichmann asserts that obedience to the law can and “must” be built into the 
categorical imperative in a reference to Kant’s political philosophy whose encounter 
with Kant’s moral law is bewildered in the courtroom. For Kant, man has “no right to 
seditio or rebellio” and an individual must subordinate his determination of the law to 
the law as determined by the sovereign, regardless of his freedom within moral Law 
wherein he is a self-legislator (and even if the sovereign exceeds his authority).15 In 
Kant’s philosophy there is no logical contradiction between these two laws—the 
moral and the political—at least not on a formal level—the exact level Kant’s theory 
will be criticised by Hegel as “empty formalism”—because the ordinary “duty” by 
which a man must submit to the sovereign or State is itself a categorical imperative, 
as Eichmann points out. (If everyone was permitted to break laws, there would be no 
law and no point to the law, and so the maxim fails.) But the Moebius-like illogicality 
of Eichmann’s confession thereby returns his argument to a starting point by which 
Kant’s moral and political law lie on a single curved surface with only one boundary. 
Sovereign law by its very nature threatens to disturb the network of the moral law, 
given the sovereign is always contingent, and that there can be no authority higher 
than absolute reason.  
 
Therefore, beyond the authority of Kant and Hitler to which Eichmann refers, there 
exists a third unnamed authority in Eichmann’s speech, viz the ultimate authority of a 
universal morality predicated by Kant, in other words, the very object of Kant’s moral 
system, in which Eichmann’s “will” (Kant’s term for moral choice) is the only 
authority, if we accept Kant’s premise that the moral law is absolute and universal. 
Since Raveh and Hausner never call Eichmann to answer to himself, as a moral 
legislator under the law of absolute reason, the real test of Eichmann’s thought is 
never provided.  
 
What this also reveals is that the problem with Eichmann’s reading of Kant, is it isn’t 
a reading at all, Eichmann’s confession and discourse regarding his actions issue 
unmediated from Kant. When the word Law appears, it becomes evident that 
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Eichmann does not separate his activities and thought from Kant’s own writings. Kant 
provides both the logical structure and substance of Eichmann’s arguments, and as 
Eichmann had internalised Kant long before the trial, Kant is not a weak justification 
for murder as Arendt argued, but something more substantial and disturbing. It is 
precisely where Eichmann’s arguments conflict with the received moral or legal 
framework external to Eichmann’s thought that confirms Eichmann was obeying 
Kant. It is the encounter between these parallel legal systems that will lead us to 
claim knowledge, but to demonstrate it  ADDIN 
 
The dialogue that ensues between Raveh and Eichmann is no less bizarre as 
Eichmann and Raveh each consider that Eichmann both obeyed and did not obey the 
categorical imperative. To Raveh’s challenge about blindly following the authorities, 
Eichmann makes an objection, addressed neither to Raveh nor the court, but perhaps 
to Kant himself: Kant’s categorical imperative is impossible to apply to the holocaust 
and to Nazi Germany under the Third Reich: “Since the Kantian imperative was laid 
down, there had never been such a destructive and unprecedented order from a head 
of state. That is why it was new, and that is why there is no possibility of 
comparisons, and no...one cannot have any idea of how it was. There was the War. I 
had to do just one thing. I had to obey…” Eichmann appeals to the inconceivable, 
exceptional nature of Hitler’s world order and therefore the impossibility of 
universalising any of its principles. Yet he had already agreed to the Final Solution 
when he joined the SD prior to the mass killings that he himself would operationalise, 
meaning he not only found it conceivable, he was the person who made Auschwitz a 
reality. Raveh: “I understood from the first part of your answer that you meant that 
these years in which you were a blind recipient of orders would be excluded from life 
according to the Kantian imperative…” Eichmann replies: “Killing people violently 
cannot be according to the spirit of the Kantian imperative, because in principle it is 
not something Godgiven.”16 Obviously, Kant would never have approved of the mass 
extermination of six million Jews in Eastern Europe planned by Eichmann. By 
Godgiven, Eichmann is referring to Kant’s term for the moral law in Groundwork 
called “the Kingdom of God on Earth.” 
 
Raveh openly avoids the content of Eichmann’s statement, and fixates instead on its 
formal structure: “That means that there was a time when you did not live by the 
categorical imperative?” Eichmann consents, he ceased to live according to the 
categorical imperative “from the moment when I was transferred against my will, and 
against my wishes, to Berlin…until the end.” Eichmann again silently assumes Kant’s 
technical concept of “will,” not the quotidian one heard in the courtroom. The will is 
what impels one to obey the moral law, neither out of desire nor personal wishes but 
according to reason alone. Raveh points out the circularity of Eichmann’s statements: 
“And throughout this time it was clear to you that during that period you could not 
live by the categorical imperative, although you had in principle arranged actually to 
live your life by it?”  
 
Eichmann: “During this time I read Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason… for the first 
time.” Raveh: “So… it was only then that you encountered the idea of the categorical 
concept?” Eichmann: “I had come across this earlier, but I had not concerned myself 
particularly with it; instead, the Kantian categorical imperative was disposed of 
shortly as follows: ‘True to the law, obedient, a proper personal life, not to come into 
conflict with the law.’ This, I would say, was the categorical imperative for a small 
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man’s domestic use.” Eichmann’s claim is he only learned the true meaning of the 
categorical imperative, of Kant’s higher moral law, at the precise moment he joined 
the SD and decided to read the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, which he had come 
across previously. Eichmann’s autobiography is fundamentally epistemological: while 
he had previously mistaken the categorical imperative for obedience to the State, after 
joining the Nazis, he assumed the higher categorical imperative based on a pure 
morality in the realm of higher reason.  
 
Raveh asks “from where had you taken this definition of the categorical imperative 
for the ‘small man’? When you read Kant later, did you find it corresponded to his 
definition?” Eichmann: “No, I sensed this earlier on, because for someone like myself 
it is not possible to understand all of the subject of Kant completely; instead, I only 
took from these writings what I could understand, and what my imagination could 
somehow grasp.” Raveh repeats his question: “So I understand that you learned the 
true concept at the time you were dealing with the deportation of Jews? Eichmann: 
“As to whether it was the genuine complete concept of the categorical imperative, I 
am still not able to grasp even today.” Even in claiming that he did not understand, 
Eichmann reveals his close reading and allegiance to Kant.  
 
If Eichmann did not grasp the categorical imperative, he could not have identified its 
two connotations (the small man versus the big man), or that he could no longer live 
by the categorical imperative under the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler when he was 
divested of free will. If unlike Arendt we assume that Eichmann had perfectly 
assimilated Kant’s categorical imperative, the meaning of his statement might be that 
he became the ‘small man’ of the small law during Auschwitz, precisely in organising 
the mass deportations under instructions from the ‘big man’ Reinhard Heydrich, 
under the ‘big law’ of the Führerprinzip – thus superimposed onto Kant’s absolute 
moral law. Eichmann did not terminate the categorical imperative during the 
Holocaust but set it in motion for the first time.  
 
Eichmann’s alleged confusion about his own understanding versus Kant’s concept of 
the “understanding” is instructive. In Kantian terms, Raveh wants to know if 
Eichmann’s “experience” of implementing the final solution—the combination of 
“intuition” (sense impressions) and “concepts”—produced genuine knowledge of 
Kant or a distortion.  Eichmann claims he had only the “imagination” – the “faculty of 
a priori synthesis” whereby sense impressions become a coherent unity. i.e. he had 
only the “appearance” of Auschwitz (as its logistical conductor), but not the 
“understanding,” meaning he lacked the unity of concepts, the architecture that 
constitutes knowledge. In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defined “pure reason” as 
“architectonic,” meaning it treats any knowledge as part of a “systematic unity” of 
laws. Even if that reasoning is false or mere projection, it will seek out a unified legal 
“network” or whole to house itself. That architectural totality for Kant is “pure” i.e. 
theoretical, meaning it does not arise from empirical  knowledge, from objects of 
experience or actions, “the interests of reason,” but exists a priori.17 Therefore the 
meaning of Eichmann’s disavowal is that there existed no architecture for his actions. 
Arendt accuses Eichmann of both ‘playing dumb,’ for cynical reasons, and for being 
dumb—for his suspension of thought in blindly carrying out his duties in the 
Holocaust: the claim “that no one thought about anything, one could not think.” But if 
there is a reason to resurrect the court transcripts it is to make evident that Eichmann 
was engaged in analytic thought until the bitter end, that he was not a mere bureaucrat 
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as Arendt argued – rather, as Eichmann acknowledges here, his attempt to construct 
the “Jewish Problem” by reading Kant did not yield any architectonics of reason. 
Eichmann provides his own auto-refutation that can only be decoded by a reading of 
Kant. 
 
According to his own analysis then, Eichmann was neither motivated by Kant to 
undertake Hitler’s orders, nor did Kant order him to do so. Eichmann already hated 
the Jews just as he had already read Kant. Eichmann in Jerusalem concealed the 
unKantian dimension of his motivation by repeating his small man refrain to Raveh: I 
was impotent to take any action, I acted under duress. Raveh: “You are now saying 
that you were not able to leave the Party, having once joined it, is that your statement? 
Eichmann: “No … as of the beginning of the War there was no leaving, nor any other 
possibility of doing anything of one’s own free will. And before that, there was first 
of all the swearing of the oath to the forces, and the oath when I joined the Security 
Service Head Office…”18 
 
In turn, Raveh explains that he wishes to read out an earlier passage from the 
prosecutor: “Hausner: ‘I wish to know whether you tried to leave the Nazi Party and 
the SS.’ Eichmann: ‘I did not try to leave the SS and the Party. Hausner: And you 
remained in them of your own free will and free choice?’ Eichmann: ’A member of 
the SS and the Party, yes…’” Raveh: “I thought that you remained in the SS 
throughout the years of the War, despite your pangs of conscience, because you knew 
perfectly well that there was no possibility of getting out of the SS. Now I read your 
words here, and that must be interpreted as follows: ‘I remained a member of the SS 
and the Party of my own free will.’ “Eichmann: ”Yes, well, I could not have done this 
even if I had wanted to.”19  
 
Eichmann is referring to the cardinal rule in Kant’s moral realm: one cannot exit the 
moral law – as one can leave a sports club; in doing so, Eichmann substitutes Kant’s 
moral law for the Führer’s law or God’s Kingdom. Eichmann further indicates, what 
one wants to do (to go to Berlin or not) is irrelevant in Kant – that one follows the 
principle is the only measure of moral worth. Raveh: “I consider you to be intelligent 
enough to understand this contradiction, that there is a contradiction here. Do you 
have anything further to say about this?”20 Eichmann: “There is a contradiction here, 
but even if one had wanted to, it would have been Impossible…” In other words, his 
claim is that he did want to, and that at the same time he had no choice; a position that 
short circuits Kant’s concept of moral autonomy, since there can not be conformance 
to the law by a sense of duty, if one performs it out of desire – that is Eichmann’s 
surplus that destroys any possibility of a moral architecture as per Theorem 1 in the 
second Critique.21  
 
Eichmann is the worst example of a Kantian subject, even after having read Kant 
correctly. He openly desires to commit the immoral acts that he also deems to be 
categorically imperative. This observation is contrary to Zizek’s theory that Eichmann 
was “following his duty to follow his duty.” Indeed, Kant’s concept of “duty” is from 
Eichmann’s perspective both superfluous and exegetical. The contradiction noted by 
Raveh already exists in Kant’s notion of duty, where one rationally and freely decides 
to follow the reason of moral law, against one’s inclinations – and the meaning of 
‘duty to the law’ is sharpened in the case of adverse consequences. That is where 
Arendt and Zizek are mistaken. Kantian duty does not mean you don’t think, but on 
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the contrary the decision to obey moral law is obtained via a process of logical 
reasoning – it means to actively and freely construct the law-like network in which 
morality obtains. Duty and the conscious conformance to the law is not Eichmann’s 
excuse or even his real motive – it is the basis of Kant’s moral system. 
 
While Hausner uses the Socratic method to make Eichmann admit his guilt, Eichmann 
will only admit to being guilty of the mass transportations of the Jews not their deaths 
i.e. the formal organisation and “synthesis,” namely the architectonics of killing as 
opposed to killing. To maintain his story about not being responsible, Eichmann will 
also lie that he did not agree with the killing of the Jews. A lie so convincing, it will 
pay off. He argues he was a mere transporter or logistical carrier for murder far from 
the figure of the killer himself; that he remained within the realm of noumena not 
phenomena, the latter wherein the real crime took place. However, in Kant’s 
transcendental idealism, Eichmann’s mind sought to provide the structure to carrying 
out the Final Solution: the a priori space that gives moral content to the action; and 
even if he thoroughly failed, therein lies his liability. 
 
1945-1946: Wisliceny’s Eichmann 
 
Eichmann’s moral bisection of the act of murder (murder = reason plus action) is 
undermined by the fact that he grossly misrepresented himself in Jerusalem, evident 
in the Nuremberg trials. Gabriel Bach, assistant to Hausner, resided in the same prison 
building where Eichmann was isolated, and spoke to Eichmann daily for the eight 
month duration of his incarceration, as per Bach’s account of the trial. In the final 
stage of the trial Bach wrote: “my team presented evidence that Eichmann said to 
friends, ‘I know the war is lost but I am still going to win my war against the Jews,’ 
and then he went to Auschwitz to get the death rate increased from ten thousand a day 
to twelve thousand a day. And to Willem Sassen he boasted that if he managed to kill 
eleven million Jews, then he would have done something important for history.” 22 
 
This established that Eichmann personally and ideologically believed in killing the 
Jews, and was not merely following orders, or following his duty for the sake of 
Kantian duty, but believed it desirable and imperative to kill the Jews. He was making 
an autonomous judgement, and thereby obeying the categorical imperative, in the 
strictest architectonic sense, counter to his original argument he was merely following 
the small man version of Kant’s law. That Eichmann believed in the morality of 
Hitler’s credo is not controversial. That Eichmann took fanatical pleasure in killing 
Jews, evidenced in the Nuremberg trials (1945-1946) by material confirmed by 
Eichmann himself 15 years later in Jerusalem (1961), has been obscured, not merely 
bracketed, for historical reasons that still remain unclear.  
 
The gap in Arendt’s portrait of Eichmann in Jerusalem can be found in the 
Nuremberg transcripts, where the absent Eichmann comes into greater focus via third 
person testimony. In the cross examination of SS officer Dieter Wisliceny in the 
Nuremberg Trials in 1946 it emerged that Eichmann was responsible for the death of 
the Jewish communities in Greece, Hungary and Slovakia. Wisliceny testified that he 
knew Eichmann from 1934, because the two SS officers joined the Sicherheitsdienst 
SD (Security Service) around this same time, and remained in the same department 
until 1937. Lieutenant Colonel Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.: When did you last see 
Eichmann? WISLICENY: I last saw Eichmann towards the end of February 1945 in 
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Berlin. At that time he said that if the war were lost he would commit suicide. LT. 
COL. BROOKHART: Did he say anything at that time as to the number of Jews that 
had been killed? WISLICENY: Yes, he expressed this in a particularly cynical 
manner. He said ‘I would leap laughing into the grave because the feeling that I had 5 
million Jews on my conscience would be for me a source of extraordinary 
satisfaction.’23 Hausner famously lifted this passage from the Nuremberg Trials, and 
Eichmann agreed to its authorship by himself, thereby undermining his answers in 
Jerusalem.  
 
The reason killing Jews is a confirmed categorical imperative in Eichmann’s mind is 
now obvious. If Eichmann first and foremost thought killing Jews was a necessary 
evil to preserve the purity and preservation of the German race, that would constitute 
a hypothetical not a categorical imperative. A categorical imperative is good in and of 
itself, not a causality premised on some good end outside itself – the latter is what 
Kant calls a “hypothetical imperative.” Wisliceny’s portrait tells us that Eichmann 
passionately killed, out of fervour and hatred and no more. Killing the Jews was a 
“good” and an end in itself and therefore logically conforms to Kant’s definition of 
the categorical imperative. The killing of Jews in Auschwitz was not instrumental, 
like the examples of slavery, kidnapping, or colonisation. Genocide is no more 
instrumental or purposive than murder by a serial killer – neither serve any function 
outside the act of murder.  
 
However, Wisliceny’s memory of Eichmann the psychopath thus suggests Eichmann 
was also not acting according to the categorical imperative. Pleasure in Kant that 
informs the ‘moral’ act, is contrary to the categorical imperative. Kant thus makes 
transparent that there are not only two versions of history here, there are two subjects: 
Eichmann’s Eichmann who plays the figure of the super-ego (I acted responsibly; I 
obeyed the law, I did my duty), and Wisliceny’s Eichmann who has no super-ego, and 
is pure id (I gratified my desire for murder). Wisliceny provides more material to 
allow us to get to know Eichmann. 
 
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did you have an opportunity to examine files in 
Eichmann’s office? WISLICENY: Yes; I frequently had occasion to examine the files 
in Eichmann’s office. I know that he handled with special care any files which had to 
do with questions concerning his own special task. He was in every respect a 
confirmed bureaucrat; he immediately recorded in the files every discussion he ever 
had with any of his superiors. He always pointed out to me that the most important 
thing was for him to be covered by his superiors at all times. He shunned all personal 
responsibility and took good care to take shelter behind his superiors – in this case 
Müller and Kaltenbrunner – when it was a question of responsibility for his actions. 
 
LT. COL. BROOKHART: In the case of a typical report going from Eichmann’s 
department through Müller, Kaltenbrunner, to Himmler, have you seen copies of such 
reports in Eichmann’s file? WISLICENY: Yes, of course there were many such 
copies in the files. The regular channel was as follows: Eichmann had a draft made by 
a specialist or he made it himself; this draft went to Gruppenführer Müller, his 
department chief; Müller either signed this draft himself or left the signing to 
Eichmann. In most cases, when reports to Kaltenbrunner and Himmler were 
concerned, Müller signed them himself. Whenever reports were signed by Müller 
without any alteration they were returned to Eichmann’s office, where a first copy and 
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one carbon copy were prepared. The first copy then went back to Muter [sic] for his 
signature, and thence it was forwarded either to Kaltenbrunner or to Himmler. In 
individual cases where reports to Himmler were involved, Kaltenbrunner signed them 
himself. I myself have seen carbon copies with Kaltenbrunner’s signature. 
 
Eichmann is a Psychopath  
 
Here we are listening in on what appears to be the earliest echoes of Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, in Nuremberg, the Eichmann that Arendt will dismiss as “banal” normal 
and Wiesenthal, a “desk murderer.” Lacan’s essay on the Marquis de Sade repeats 
Arendt’s central argument qua Eichmann of the Kantian i.e. formalistic character of 
Sadean behaviour. For Lacan, de Sade does not seek pleasure as a utilitarian end, but 
rather the enactment of the formal logic of the law for the sake of itself. It is this 
formalistic view of Eichmann’s Kant that Lacan, Zizek and Arendt share – in Kant’s 
words “it is not sufficient to do that which should be morally good that it conform to 
the law; it must be done for the sake of the law.”24 But is that all? Is Eichmann merely 
evil “out of principle” as Zizek writes? We could reverse Kant’s formula and argue 
that it is Eichmann’s desire that is not autonomous because of the surplus of the Moral 
Law that he bathes in. If Eichmann enjoyed murder first and foremost, then, contrary 
to Arendt, he has more in common with a psychopath than Kant. The diagnostic 
criteria for psychopathy that had not been established at the time of Arendt’s book 
include everything that annoyed Arendt about Eichmann: normalcy or reasonableness, 
shallow affect (un-emotive presentation), absence of remorse, refusal to accept 
responsibility, and gross lying in court.25 Perhaps Freud who said that repressed 
sadistic impulses are the basis of the human psyche is more helpful than Lacan in a 
psychoanalytic discussion about Eichmann on Kant. The repression of sadism in a 
normal person is made possible by the super ego. Lacan conceives of a Kantian 
superego that is the manifestation of an internal task master; and that the figure of a 
Sadean executioner is therefore acting in an “ethical” manner by seeking to obey such 
a merciless master. However, it must be said, there is no tripartite structure (id, ego, 
superego) in Eichmann because, as has been recently discovered, psychopaths have 
no super ego.26 Kant had a term for such a killer: “radical evil,” Kant’s likely reading 
of Eichmann that Arendt’s “banal evil” was supposed to reverse. Unlike banality, 
radical evil is innate, based on inclination not reason, and therefore if we use Kant’s 
label, Eichmann has nothing to do with Kantian thought or any of his books.  
 
However, in addition to Eichmann’s first pleasure of killing, Wisliceny’s account also 
admits an important second pleasure, viz Eichmann’s elaboration of legal paperwork 
that is the legal surplus to the act of killing. Eichmann stressed the importance of 
“being covered by his superiors at all times.” He produced the deadly written 
instruction signed by Hitler to “soothe Wisliceny’s conscience”—to “help” him 
accept that the final solution meant the murdering of all the Jews, when Wisliceny 
first learned of Eichmann’s endgame. It is in this sense that one might go along with 
Lacan in aligning the Kantian (internal) voice of morality— that issues moral edicts—
to Eichmann himself: a sadist tyrant who issues limitless demands to Wisliceny. This 
formula is applicable to Wisliceny who was at first horrified by the document 
Eichmann presented and yet did not turn back. (Wisliceny is a murderer and 
sycophant, but not a psychopath – he has the experience of guilt.) For Eichmann, by 
contrast, there is no tyrant whispering instructions in his ear; hence there is no point in 
assigning an internal-external moral duality to Eichmann, as per Kant, because in 
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Eichmann there is only exteriority (one voice, one surface). To Eichmann’s claim I 
was just following orders, I say it is not an order if you already want to do it. The 
Führer was not Eichmann’s master-oppressor but the opposite: an enabler and opiate 
in the guise of a parental figure who provided approval and reward as to a dog who 
fetches a ball. The master doesn’t insulate Eichmann from responsibility or 
conscience like Eichmann did for Wisliceny, because Eichmann has no conscience 
(no super ego). Eichmann’s lie, the logic of the Führer as the small man’s opiate, is 
merely the logic he uses to get out of jail.  
 
The real opiate Eichmann craves is to be connected to the Führer—to touch God 
himself. For Kant, there is one legitimate pleasure that attends the categorical 
imperative as surplus—the sublime pleasure or jouissance that a man who obeys the 
categorical imperative experiences in entering the hallowed realm of Moral Law, the 
kingdom of God, in which he is the lord’s holy emissary. Eichmann constructed an 
elaborate paper trail, a signifying chain that was not merely his insurance for war 
crimes but the proof he was a direct conduit to Hitler (God). In this sense, Eichmann 
was utterly Kantian. It was a stroke of brilliance to appeal to the semiotic chain of 
command in Jerusalem, and thereby conceal the sublime object of the crime. 
Eichmann was not following orders at all – he was touching the hand of God.  
 
By making moral injunctions real via the printed page, by putting the law in writing, a 
putting into practice that is also a recording apparatus, the paperwork functioned as a 
mind – the cortex and nervous system by which the euphoric flows of murder travel 
unimpeded. In Kant’s transcendental idealism, the mind imposes structures on 
incoming data that allows any information to be understood. It is the Nazi mind’s 
prior architecture that made the realisation of Auschwitz possible. Eichmann was 
structuring a necessary fiction, a formal edifice to make murder morally intelligible a 
priori. And this is what it might mean to say an architecture of a fascist mind, or 
architectonics of evil. In his search for the general laws covering the experience of 
mass genocide, Eichmann’s collection of signatures forms “a thoroughgoing lawlike 
network” (durchgaengig gesestzmaessiger Zusammenhang), Kant’s term for an 
architectonic unity. Kant provided Eichmann with the “formal logic to clarify 
concepts,” whereas the chain of command provided Eichmann the “transcendental 
logic for how to construct objects.”  
 
This logical exploration entailed two separable pleasures: the non-Kantian pleasure of 
murdering “I will go to my grave laughing…”, and the Kantian pleasure of signatures 
and papers “being covered by ones superiors” (being blanketed by the Law)—the 
higher pleasure of touching God that exists as a surplus to desiring-murder.27 The 
former provides the image of a psychopath at the ego-level, and the latter the 
obsessive recording apparatus of the psychopath’s union with God. Both pleasures are 
achieved in the actualisation of the idea of killing. Even if murder is contrary to 
Kant’s Second Formulation, the holocaust is the first time that Kant’s moral law was 
actualised in the policy of the Third Reich. For Kant, the moral law is designed to be 
put into practice. It is not hypothetical, because even if the moral value of the idea is 
decided prior to its action, action must be done. Without the sensible, without the 
world of objects, there are no ideas and there can be no morality. Many have 
intervened at this juncture, how could Kant have prefigured the holocaust if murder is 
contrary to Kant in every sense? Kant’s Second Formulation in the categorical 
imperative requires that one should never “treat a person as a means to an end, but as 
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an end” in themselves, such that Kant scholars have always argued that genocide of 
one people for the ends of another can never be an imperative. But, as I argue above, 
it is necessary to reverse this critique. For Eichmann’s psychopathology does not 
locate murder as an end to anything outside the end of murder – and therefore unlike 
murder for self-defence, punishment or revenge, Eichmann’s actions do not breach 
the Second Formulation of the categorical imperative. This fact is no clearer or more 
disturbing than in Eichmann’s statement “we did not even consider the Jews human.” 
 
There May Be No Morality 
 
In Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant writes: “The real morality of actions—their merit 
or demerit, and even that of our own conduct, is completely unknown to us. Our 
estimates can relate only to their empirical character. How much is the result of the 
action of free will, how much is to be ascribed to nature and to blameless error, or to 
a happy constitution of temperament (merito fortunae), no one can discover, nor, for 
this reason, determine with perfect justice.”28 This astonishing admission threatens to 
collapse Kant’s edifice. Morality is an ideal that can never be known or attained, 
because we can never know the moral value of our actions (i.e. the categorical 
imperative can only tell us how to act, not whether that act is moral). Worse, the 
principle of autonomy is shaky, since perhaps my moral conclusion issues from a 
genetic (personality) defect and not autonomy, truly free judgement. Furthermore, in 
The Critique of Practical Reason, universality itself is no guarantee of morality: “I 
omit to mention that universal assent does not prove the objective validity of a 
judgement (i.e., its validity as a cognition), and although this universal assent should 
accidentally happen, it could furnish no proof of agreement with the object; on the 
contrary, it is the objective validity which alone constitutes the basis of a necessary 
universal consent.”29 i.e. the consensus among the Nazis is irrelevant to morality. In 
the Groundwork, as an antidote to these worries, Kant imagined a hypothetical world 
the “Kingdom of Ends” where everyone lived according to the categorical imperative, 
enacted by a “community of legislators,” where no person is ever treated as a means 
to an end – but this fantasy only serves to demonstrate that moral truth is utopian. 
 
The holocaust confirms Kant’s question about the autonomy principle, just as it 
paradoxically reveals the categorical imperative could only ever be realised single 
handedly: by a dictator who is the enunciator of the moral law ensuring the intrinsic 
parity or identical message and iteration for every small man, the small men together 
forming an aggregate of identical Nazi legislators. The holocaust actualises Kant’s 
moral dictum, precisely by dissolving the autonomy principle, by transferring 
criticality (autonomy) from the small to the big man who ensures the universality of 
the law. Under this diabolical suspension from reality—in the post-human realm of 
universality that turns out to be less pleasurable than terrifying—the categorical 
imperative permits that anything at all could be made to be moral if it is logically 
robust; if, like a successful scientific experiment based on a single principle, the 
results can be infinitely duplicated and thereby prove the rule. But in order to bring 
the categorical imperative to life, in Kantian terms, and thereby test the robustness of 
the theory, a big man (the dictator) is required. Hence, the holocaust is not a 
perversion of Kant, but the necessary reversal required to complete it.30 A 
transcendent authority who suppresses freedom/criticality and incarnates the law itself 
is required to make the categorical imperative fulfill its historical destiny. In Europe, 
hatred for the Jews was already deeply embedded in the German mind long before 
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Auschwitz. When the dictator appears in the flesh and corporealises what was once 
only pure abstraction and interiority (psychopathology), an imaginary edifice, the real 
of truth, materialises before everyone’s eyes in the guise of a man. Not only do I now 
know what to do, I act. I take action. If thou shalt kill Jews is legitimised in advance 
by the higher authority it becomes simple for the small man (who is already a 
passionate anti-Semite) to carry it out from his desk, to industrially serialise the 
killing until the bitter end (hence Endlösung or final solution). 
 
Eichmann’s trial was dismissed by Arendt as the Sprach of an empty bureaucratese, 
yet the court transcripts demonstrate that the holocaust mind is the most substantial 
and formal of architectures. It’s exceptionality – its horrific originality comes from 
the labyrinthine logic of the posthuman, the architectonics of evil. It was precisely the 
universal horror at the formalistic (logical) nature of Eichmann’s trial that led to both 
the ‘aqua fortis of condemnation’ of Arendt, and ultimately, the incompleteness of 
her investigation (she was effectively silenced and forced to retract her book). Since 
the forgiveness of Arendt, Arendt’s portrait of Eichmann including her book’s first 
premise that Eichmann was normal has remained the operative methodology of 
contemporary readings of Eichmann on Kant, including Lacan, Zizek, and Zupančič 
who all formulate the question of evil from the perspective of the normal 
psychoanalytic subject. But there is a reason Kant uses the word “radical,” meaning 
constitutionally excluded (radically apart) from the subject-position of the moral 
legislator to which Kant’s moral philosophy is addressed. Radical evil precludes 
autonomy, freedom and the good will, and is thereby logically outside of Kant’s 
moral law. This essay returns to the Eichmann transcripts, to the famous passage 
which stands as a diabolical reordering of what is human and what is subhuman under 
the extra-Kantian realm of the suprahuman (the Nazis). These are the items of a new 
logical reordering of subjectivity that the Kantian-legal framework provides traction.	
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